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Abstract 
Post-conflict societies, such as South Sudan are characterised by weak regulatory 
frameworks and lack of political will to implement much needed reforms. This often impacts 
directly on the economy. The legal, social and financial environment is also weakened in the 
process, leading to the demise of key economic drivers. The small and medium enterprise 
(SME) sector is critical for the growth of nascent economies such as South Sudan’s. The 
effectiveness of SMEs as key economic drivers is amongst other things dependent on their 
access to credit. With only a few SME-specific credit facilities in South Sudan at the moment, 
it is important that these institutions adopt funding models that will suit the poor, most of 
whom do not have collateral and credit history. Group lending appears as a suitable model 
for the poor. The success of this mode of SME funding in selected jurisdictions, namely 
Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, and Colombia underscores such a position. The socio-
economic, legal and political environment of the three jurisdictions studied in this paper 
where group lending has been successful closely mirror that of South Sudan. The dynamics of 
group lending will, therefore, likely suit the needs of South Sudan. Hence it is suggested as 
one solution to uplifting the small business sector of Africa’s newest country, although 
attention must also be given to other critical development factors such as a sound regulatory 
regime, an effective taxation system and access to credit. 
 
1. Background 
Until June 2011, the State of South Sudan did not exist. The history of the formation of 
Africa’s newest State dates back to the pre-colonisation era, right through its merger with 
Sudan in the north and its subsequent secession after years of wars of self-determination. Its 
total landmass covers an area of 644 000 square kilometres with a population estimated at 
8.3 million. About 83 per cent of this population is classified as rural. The South Sudanese 
Pound is the legal tender. Fifty-one per cent of the population live below the poverty line. 
Less than one per cent of the road infrastructure is paved. Neglect and destruction due to the 
prolonged conflict has resulted in massive infrastructure loss. Today, South Sudan is 
considered one of the world’s poorest countries, with just 30 miles of paved roads and only 
15 per cent literacy rate (World Bank, 2011; Raganathan and Briceno-Garmendia, 2011). 
Despite going into oil exports as from 1999, South Sudan’s economy continues to suffer from 
macro-economic instability and high levels of poverty, unemployment and debt. The oil 




US$4,522million in 2006, has failed to impact on other sectors of the South Sudanese 
economy because of high uncertainty, volatility and risk of dependence on fluctuating oil 
prices in the international market, unsustained oil revenues and lack of diversification (Nour, 
2011). Like most African territories, pre-colonial Sudan was organised under traditional 
African leadership, where indigenous peoples formed independent self-governing entities (El 
Obaid and Appia-Gei Atua, 1996). Many tribal kingdoms existed, particularly in the south. 
With the Ottoman Empire’s occupation from 1821 to 1885 the territory saw the rise of the 
nation State in Northern Sudan. The South was also subject to British colonial rule during 
the years 1898 to 1956 with Egypt rubber-stamping the arrangement. In 1956 Sudan 
obtained independence from Britain, which until 1946 had ruled the Sudan as two separate 
entities, even though ten years earlier, the British had decided to merge the South and the 
North into one entity. Hence independence was granted to Sudan as a single unified nation 
(Bradbury, 2013). The merger was however, filled with endless problems. Both South Sudan 
and the other peripheral regions in the western and eastern parts of the country were 
characterised by political, economic, and cultural hegemony and marginalization by the 
apparatus of the Sudanese State in the centre (Jok, 2007). Political discontent characterised 
the fragile relationship that was sustained over years by the two merged entities. There were 
allegations that politicians of the North were not so much concerned with the people of the 
South as they were with South Sudan as a real estate and a resource base (Jok, 2007). This 
139 marginalisation of the South was exacerbated by patronising behaviour and ethnic 
tensions often encouraged by ‘divide and rule’ policies, thus ensuring that ultimate control of 
political and economic power primarily lay in the hands of one ethnic group (Bayart et al., 
1999; Cheru, 2002). The region suffered from lack of infrastructure development and serious 
neglect of existing infrastructure as a result of two episodes of civil war (1955- 72 and 1983-
2005). This also resulted in major destruction and displacement of much needed 
infrastructure, thereby negatively impacting upon the largely rural and subsistence economy. 
The two decades of civil war claimed 2 million lives, and internally displaced some 4 million 
others. Yet another significant amount of people were forced to flee the country and seek 
refuge across the African continent and the globe. The conflict was not necessarily restricted 
to the South Sudan region, there were other territories where armed conflict also took place 
on a regular and sustained basis (Bradbury, 2013). Conflicts were inordinately reported in 
the regions of the Nuba Mountains, the Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, eastern Sudan and Dafur. 
This therefore made the entire region unstable, and crippled its growth. The conflict that had 
plagued Sudan ended after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 
January 2005, paving way for a new constitutional order. It allowed for a referendum to be 
held, in terms of which the question of whether or not South Sudan would secede from the 
North was determined (Bradbury, 2013). In January 2011, the people of Sudan voted in 
favour of secession from the northern territory. Those voting in favour of the creation of a 
new State represented over 98 per cent of the registered voters. Consequently, on 9 July 2011 
which marked the end of the transition period envisaged by the CPA, the new State of South 
Sudan was born. Thereafter the Government of South Sudan quickly complied with the 




recommended the membership of South Sudan to the UN on 13 July 2011, and the UN 
General Assembly welcomed South Sudan as the 193rd State on 14 July 2011.1 One way to 
address the high levels of poverty in the country is by providing credit to the poor, 
particularly in peasant and agrarian societies such as South Sudan (Abdalla, 2013). Yet, 
accessing credit in South Sudan remains a challenge and this is partly due to the fact that 
there are only a few microfinance institutions that grant credit for starting businesses. A 
further core problem that hinders microfinance institutions from increasing their footprint 
in South Sudan is information asymmetry. Oteng-Abayie et al., (2011) also attribute this to 
either poor portfolio quality to meet the excess demand or a misapplication of capital 
resources in the microfinance sector. The lack of access to credit limits the realization of 
growth potential for SMEs; which includes greater participation and maximization of social 
capital, increased empowerment, poverty reduction, and stimulating entrepreneurship 
(Neverson, 2013). It therefore becomes imperative to explore a lending model that will 
address the challenges of information asymmetry, whilst at the same time being effective in 
addressing the credit scarcity situation. The aims are broadly to review the SME sector in 
South Sudan and outline its contribution to economic growth; explore the role of 
microfinance in post-conflict States; analyse the suitability of group lending model as one of 
the ideal models and its applicability especially in post-conflict states and recommend the 
most suitable type of group lending in South Sudan. 
 
2. Significance of the study 
These aims are important because as highlighted above, South Sudan is a new State and has 
just come out of war. It is currently building its economy through the establishment of 
institutions and the promotion of sustainable development through sound economic policies. 
Amongst these economic growth policies, SME development takes centre stage, hence the 
need to prioritise the improvement of the business environment. With a majority of the 
population located in rural areas and living under the poverty line, access to finance by the 
poor is vital for economic growth. Studies on the provision of finance or business 
development and support programmes in South Sudan are limited. The unavailability of such 
studies creates a knowledge gap on their effectiveness in improving the lives of the poor. This 
study will therefore contribute towards bridging that gap to enable policy makers and the 
private sector in South Sudan to successfully grow the economy. The paper was premised on 
the assumption that the Sudanese conflict led to a 141 collapse of key institutions and 
frameworks which are key to SME development. This impedes South Sudan’s efforts to 
rejuvenate its economy nine years after the CPA which ended the conflict was signed, and 
three years since South Sudan came into existence. The solution might lie in the model of 
financing known as group lending. 
                                                          
1 This is a simple procedure where the State desiring admission submits an application to the Secretary-General and a letter formally 
stating that it accepts the obligations under the Charter of the UN. The UN Security Council (UNSC) then considers the application. Any 
recommendation for admission must receive the affirmative votes of 9 of the 15 members of the UNSC, provided that none of its five 
permanent members — China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America — have voted 
against the application. If the UNSC recommends admission, the recommendation is presented to the General Assembly for 
consideration. A two-thirds majority vote is necessary in the General Assembly for admission of a new State. Membership becomes 
effective the on date the resolution for admission is adopted. The recognition of South Sudan as a State was quick, and this can be 
attributed to a great extent to the role of the UN in admitting this new entity to its membership through UNSC Resolution 




3. The South Sudanese economy 
As highlighted above, South Sudan’s economy is still struggling to recover from the effects of 
the 20 years of political unrest (Taha, 2012). The economy is predominantly subsistent and 
highly dependent on imported foods. Since independence, South Sudan’s economy has been 
embroiled with high inflation especially in the first 12 months after independence. Inflation 
reached 80 per cent during that year and was driven by the increase in food prices (Akongdit, 
2013). South Sudan is highly dependent on oil and the oil exports account for almost the 
totality of exports and about 80 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2013). The income from the 
oil exports finances about 70 per cent of public spending and the remainder comes from the 
donor community. This heavy reliance on donor funding and oil revenues, however, raises 
two concerns (i) the fluctuation of oil prices could have a huge impact on government 
revenues and development programs and (ii) vulnerability of the exchange rate. Nour (2011) 
also highlights that whilst South Sudan’s oil exports have many positive effects on the 
economy, the negatives still remain highly problematic. These include lack of economic 
diversification and a volatile fiscal policy resulting from oil earnings that enter the economy 
predominantly through public finance channels. The population in South Sudan is increasing 
with major implications for the economy. South Sudan has a population size of 8.26million 
(2008 estimates) which comprises a majority of young people (72 per cent below age of 30). 
It has, however, been reported that there has been a substantial inflow of returning Sudanese 
citizens after the signing of the CPA. These statistics may be outdated but there has not been 
an official census since then. Some authors have estimated the population to be 10.05million 
in 2011. This rapid population growth will pose a threat the country’s economic growth 
because it will put a strain on the provision of health, education and infrastructure services. 
However, on a more positive note, the population growth can translate to a rapid growth in 
the labour force (AfDB, 2013). Notably, the population boom also translated to influx as 
people were drawn towards South Sudan’s capital, Juba, in search of better economic and 
living conditions. Owing to its slightly improved infrastructure and relative stability, Juba 
became the staging area for the major role players in South Sudan’s economic development, 
the non-governmental organisations, international governmental organisations and the 
Government of South Sudan itself. This convinced investors as well as business people from 
Ethiopia and Eritrea to invest, particularly in the hospitality industry (Grant and Thompson, 
2013). However, Grant and Thompson (2013) also argue that this influx led to the 
ruralisation of the Juba urban space, and hence encouraged a continuation of the informal 
economy. The South Sudanese economy is mostly agrarian (Oxfam, 2013). Currently 83 per 
cent of the population is located in rural areas. The population predominantly relies on crop 
farming or animal husbandry for their livelihood and about half of the total population (51 
per cent) live below the poverty line (Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and 
Evaluation, 2010). In fact, about 78 per cent of households depend on crop farming or 
animal husbandry as their primary source of livelihood (Government of South Sudan, 2011). 
This is further compounded by low literacy rates, which mean that a majority of the labour 
force is unskilled or lacks professional skills. The implications of this problem are huge 
because there will be a large inflow of foreign skilled workers therefore exerting pressures on 
domestic wage rates (Maxwell et al., 2012). All the above are set within the context of a South 




unpaved. The rail network is still being rehabilitated after being damaged during the conflict. 
Access to electricity is still scarce, only 1 per cent of the population has access to electricity. 
Access to water supply and sanitation is still heavily constrained. Communication 
infrastructure is also undeveloped (AfDB, 2013). Donor support in South Sudan has played a 
major role in improving the population’s economic and social welfare. Total donor 
commitments in 2010 amounted to US$ 4.2 billion excluding US$ 4 billion injected into 
peacekeeping initiatives in the same period. This aid architecture has, however, neglected the 
primary role of building government capacity and legitimacy but focused mainly on 
humanitarian activities. It is worth noting that the World Bank has put a strategy in place to 
help South Sudan overcome the aforementioned challenges. The strategy’s core focus areas 
are (i) improving economic management and governance for effective local service delivery 
and (ii) expanding productive employment opportunities (World Bank, 2013). 143 In spite of 
these seemingly positive developments, not all is well with the South Sudanese economy. 
Three problems are particularly pressing. First, weak national security poses a threat to the 
economy. The continued internal conflict amongst ethnic and tribal groups has resulted in 
over 2 million people killed and an equally large number displaced. Hence the capacity of the 
armed forces to protect citizens and restore order and peace is insufficient. The business 
environment is therefore left vulnerable to collapse (AfDB, 2013). Second, business activity 
in South Sudan is still concentrated in a few economic sectors. Doing business in South 
Sudan is not without delays and huge costs. South Sudan’s ranking in the Doing Business 
Report 2014 shifted to 186 from 184 in 2013. Key indicators such as starting a business, 
registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, trading across borders and 
resolving insolvency, dealing with construction and getting electricity are still of great 
concern. At the same time, indicators such as enforcing contracts and paying taxes seem to 
be well underway (World Bank, 2014). Third, cross border trade in South Sudan is still a 
huge concern. South Sudan trades mainly with its neighbours; Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and 
Kenya. It relies heavily on the sea ports of both Sudan and Kenya for any trade involving sea 
ports. The domestic conflict that erupted in December 2013 negatively affected trade flows 
within South Sudan and imports into the country through the displacement of people across 
the country, destruction of markets and the supply chain. As result the exports of sorghum, 
dry bean and maize grain from Uganda into South Sudan markets reduced drastically due to 
insecurity of cargo traffic into South Sudan (Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, 
2014). The poor have been badly affected by the weak economy. This is compounded by the 
limited number of microfinance programmes aimed at providing credit to the poor. 
According to Littlefield et al. (2003); Makina and Malobola (2004); Rhyne (1998), creating 
an enabling environment for the poor to access credit often stimulates a self-propelling cycle 
of sustainability and massive growth. It further impacts on the lives of the poor in a powerful 
way (Kotir and Obeng-Odoom 2009). Apart from these benefits, microfinance can also have 
socioeconomic benefits, by equalising the economic playing field (Kai and Hamori, 2009). 
Other benefits of microfinance include income growth and stability, reduced income 
inequality, less vulnerability, employment creation, health and nutrition improvements, 
school attendance, improved social networks and women’s empowerment (Stewart et al., 
2010; Barnes, 1996; Beck et al., 2004; Hietalahti and Linden, 2006; Hossain and Knight, 




4. Conceptual and theoretical framework 
There are a lot of countries that have experienced conflict in recent years, a majority of which 
are low income countries. Conflict has of late manifested in complex ways making it difficult 
to distinguish between peacetime and wartime. Crisp (1998) affirms that there is a thin line 
dividing war and peace in the modern world, arguing that ‘countries oscillate along a 
continuum between armed conflict and peace.’ Effectively this means that peace and war 
often coexist in any country or region. This oscillation directly affects any attempts to revive 
the economies of post-conflict countries such as South Sudan, and influences the decision on 
which lending model is best suited for each territory. Microfinance has played a crucial role 
in restarting economies in post-conflict countries. Microfinance institutions operating in 
post-conflict countries help break the vicious cycle of economic stagnation and conflict that 
continuously affects billions of people around the world. Microfinance also contributes 
immensely by providing a platform for the rekindling of social interaction and boosting 
reintegration and trust amongst communities before prompting economic recovery of the 
State (Spanda Foundation, 2011). Other known social effects of microfinance in post-conflict 
areas include the ability to empower women and refugees and other vulnerable groups, 
returning and reintegration of internally displaced people and former combatants into 
communities and reconciliation between ethnic groups (Spanda Foundation, 2011). 
 
5. The fundamentals for the growth of SMEs 
It is trite that the creation of an enabling environment for economic growth, especially in 
post-conflict societies like South Sudan is a fundamental consideration for development. 
Hence the need to ensure that the following key economic drivers are in place, viz: (i) a 
sound regulatory framework and tax regime (ii) unhindered access to new technologies (iii) 
access to finance, and (iv) development of skilled and trained labour as well as supporting 
infrastructure. In the case of South Sudan, all these pre-requisites are set within the milieu of 
an economy in transition, with a nascent legal system that is still trying to address variable 
teething problems (AfDB, 2013). Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are essential for the 
growth and sustainability of any newly democratized nation. They are the engines of job 
creation and economic growth in emerging markets that are central to the larger equation of 
development. This is true of most small businesses that operate in the developing world. 
These small businesses represent one of the developing world’s most powerful economic 
forces, contributing significantly to employment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Correctly incubated and nurtured, small businesses can be integral parts of thriving, globally 
competitive industries, and pivotal in large scale job creation, thereby reducing inequality, 
poverty and other social ills. 
 
6. The SME sector in South Sudan 
South Sudan generally lacks a history of the private sector and business culture. Over time, 
however, the private sector has come to be dominated by foreign business people, mainly 
Greeks, Syrians, Lebanese, Italians and British (AfDB, 2013). In post-independence South 
Sudan these businesses shifted hands and today nationals of neighbouring East African 
Community (EAC) countries dominate the private sector. These include business people 




prompted the South Sudanese Government in 2013 to initiate efforts to entice human capital 
currently in the diaspora, to come back and contribute to the economy. South Sudan also has 
an informal business sector, which is hardly documented. This is largely due to the trade 
restrictions and high associated costs of doing business. Nevertheless, this informal sector 
also makes significant contributions to the country’s economic growth. Be that as it may, 
there are clearly identifiable deficiencies of the informal business sector in this territory. The 
sector is therefore characterised by the following: (i) many informal businesses consider 
themselves to be entrepreneurial in character; (ii) self-employment in the informal sector is 
the preferred option; and (iii) businesses often avoid paying licence fees and then offer bribes 
to officials when caught (AfDB, 2013). The main business activities in the informal sector are 
laundry services, bread making or selling, selling of soft drinks, market stalls, grass 
collection, charcoal making or selling, artisanal quarrying and stone crushing, beer making 
or selling, domestic help and causal labour in hotels and markets. The income generated 
from these informal business activities plays a crucial role in improving the livelihood of the 
people of South Sudan. A greater portion of the income is spent on food, schools fees and 
medicine. The informal sector also provides employment to a majority of the population 
because formal sector employment is very limited and requires individuals to be skilled and 
literate (Maxwell et al., 2012). The private sector in South Sudan is still developing, and it 
comprises a large number of micro and small businesses and only a few medium and large 
sized businesses. In December 2010, there were 10, 746 businesses that were registered in 
South Sudan. A majority of these businesses (80 per cent) were involved in wholesale and 
retail trade, accommodation and food services. There were about 89 firms involved in 
construction and infrastructure related services. Out of the total registered businesses, three 
quarters employed less than three people. A majority of the registered businesses are owned 
and managed by individual entrepreneurs (AfDB, 2013). The informal sector has emerged to 
also play a crucial role in filling service delivery gaps both in urban and rural areas. The 
informal sector provides basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity which the 
national grid has failed to provide. Due to the non-existence of trade regulatory institutions, 
the informal sector has developed elaborate mechanisms to provide credit, wholesaling and 
marketing and distribution services throughout the country (World Bank, 2009). 
 
7. The regulatory framework 
Controlling business activity through various pieces of legislation presents an interesting 
insight. It can either improve the operating standards for various business activities or 
hinder the growth or development of those business activities. Hence the legislative control 
of small business has been viewed by some as an impeding factor to the growth of SMEs and 
has been termed small business ‘overkill’. Complicated laws, rules and regulations 
concerning companies can be especially tough on small and growing companies. (Bartlett 
and Bukvic, 2001). In its present state, South Sudan lacks the legal and institutional 
framework necessary to support private sector development, but that has not been a fatal 
flaw in attracting business (Kosar, 2014). This translates to lack of protections and certainty 
for investors. It also presents the new State with multifarious problems such as the 
exploitation of workers, unprotected property rights, health and safety issues, as well as lack 




gloomy, there is a bright side to it. It effectively means there is no stifling bureaucracy 
attempting to enforce a confusing set of rules and laws that could neutralize the positive 
effect of any such institutional framework (Kosar, 2014). Despite the challenges highlighted 
above, there are anchor pieces of legislation in place, that would enable one to conduct 
business in South Sudan. Of interest is the Companies Act of 2010 which regulates the 
formation and registration of companies. South Sudan seems to be following prevailing 
trends in the region in respect of shareholding; for private companies it is fixed at a 
minimum of two shareholders, whilst 50 is the minimum threshold for public companies 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2013). The Land Act of 2009 is 
also pertinent to conducting business in South Sudan. Under this Act, non-citizens are not 
allowed to own land, but can access land for investment purposes only. There are, however, 
no regulations governing how a business acquires land. Despite South Sudan’s attempts to 
regulate access to and ownership of land, this area remains a murky one. Overlapping claims 
over ownership of the same piece of land by both communities and the government are quite 
common. The negative impacts of these problems in relation to small business development 
are quite high. The problems with land ownership date back to the administration of Sudan 
by the colonial power as a single entity (ElHadary and Obeng-Odoom, 2012). Informal 
ownership, derived from traditional or customary title has over the years continued to be 
overlooked by the central government, which left many customary land owners without title 
and security of tenure and contributed to recent conflicts in Sudan. This has a negative 
impact on poverty reduction as customary land owners cannot use their property as 
collateral for accessing credit (ElHadary and Obeng-Odoom, 2012). A sound regulatory 
framework should not only create an enabling environment for SMEs to thrive, but must also 
be able to deal with threats such as corruption, which is a major threat to good governance in 
Africa in general. The capacity of governments to monitor, assess and respond to the 
problem is limited, and this is particularly true of post-conflict nascent economies. South 
Sudan has a fairly good legal framework on corruption, for example the 2012 Petroleum 
Revenue Management Bill (PRMB) instils transparency in oil transactions. This is buttressed 
by other laws such as the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act 2011 and the 
Taxation Amendment Act 2012. Despite the existence of these laws, the effectiveness of the 
South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission which was established in 2007, in dealing with 
corruption has been hampered by a weak judicial system (Wanjala, 2012). Wars have a 
tendency to re-mould social, economic and legal arrangements. The laxity with which law 
enforcement is carried out often foments delinquent practices which may over time become 
legitimised. This is further compounded by the fact that the taxation system is prone to 
collapse during war time, as it did in the Sudan region. As a result, informal tax collection 
systems began to spring up. These included roadblocks at county, state, and national 
borders. Needless to say, this system had and continues to have a very negative effect on 
prices and decisions by entrepreneurs to operate outside specific areas. This also affects the 
prices of goods, including inputs into domestically produced goods. The pressure to inflate 
prices to accommodate over taxation often renders these goods uncompetitive with imported 
finished goods. The environment also promotes multiple taxation as a product moves to the 
market throughout South Sudan, thereby leading to price increases. The net effect of this 




operations beyond the capital city of Juba. It is estimated that business profit taxes range 
from 10 per cent for a small business or enterprise, to 15 per cent for a medium sized 
business to a maximum of 20 per cent for a large business or enterprise (International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, 2013). The effect of this is to encourage the disparate 
development of South Sudan with a bias towards the Juba area. 
 
7.1 Unhindered access to new technologies 
Access to new technologies is vital to the success of SMEs. The use of appropriate technology 
improves the SMEs’ competitive advantage. It is therefore important that SMEs continually 
upgrade and improve their technology in order to become competitive and efficient (Nieman 
and Nieewenhuizen, 2009). Access to new technologies can also help businesses to 
successfully manage information throughout their functional areas (Urlacher, 1999). Access 
to technology would also allow SMEs easy access to information required for them to access 
credit, as well as simplifying the application procedure online. Without these new 
technologies in South Sudan, both financiers and SMEs lose out. Financiers cannot offer 
easily accessible platforms for loan applications, neither can they advertise their services 
online. Sudan’s infrastructure including the information, technology and communication 
sector was heavily depleted by the protracted armed conflict. For instance the 
telecommunications and postal services inherited from the British were completely 
destroyed by war and neglect. In the run up to the secession, a memorandum of 
understanding between South Sudan and Sudan facilitated the development of a mobile 
communications market in South Sudan. This soon attracted international mobile 
communications operators like MTN. Despite these advancements, the South Sudan 
telecommunications industry is still at its infancy, (Ranganathan and Briceno-Garmendia, 
2011); and the cost of accessing the new technologies is still high. Therefore, chances of 
utilisation of these new technologies by SMEs look grim. 
 
7.2 Skilled and trained labour 
The need to train labour and impart skills to the SME sector in South Sudan is further 
heightened by the fact that war situations tend to disempower many individuals. As a result, 
when hostilities end, a large portion of the society has either lost any economic skills they 
might have had prior to the war; or were prevented from acquiring any skills by the conflict. 
It therefore becomes necessary for governments of post-conflict States to invest in re-skilling 
and training of their populations. In South Sudan, there are currently efforts by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) to help SMEs with business registration and 
business management training, particularly under the IFC’s Business Edge Program. This 
has benefited more than 12 500 businesses countrywide (International Finance Corporation, 
2014). The Government of South Sudan has also embarked on efforts to try and attract skills 
lost to human capital flight, which is now highly concentrated in the diaspora in the US, the 
UK and Australia. The Government is offering skilled South Sudanese in the diaspora 
incentives to return home. For example, an educational loan scheme was established in the 
US, for South Sudanese living in the diaspora, on condition that upon completion of their 
studies they will work in South Sudan for a period of time that is equivalent to the period of 




success. They have also been criticised for being weak, despite the Government’s attempts to 
prioritise transfer of skills to locals (Grant and Thompson, 2013). 
 
7.3 Access to credit 
In its attempts to reform the informal business sector, South Sudan established the White 
Nile SME Fund which is a US$ 50million investment fund investing in SMEs with operations 
in three countries, namely South-Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda. The Fund aims to achieve 
sustainable economic development by (i) encouraging entrepreneurship in these fast growing 
markets and (ii) creating a local manufacturing, services and agricultural base to provide the 
South-Sudanese economy with locally produced goods and services. However, these noble 
interventions are hampered by the lack of risk capital and support. About 70 per cent of the 
fund will be invested in South Sudan and 15 per cent in each of the other countries. It is 
expected to provide risk capital to about 45 companies with an investment size in the range 
of US$ 100 000 to a maximum of US$ 2million (Africa Assets, 2014). In general, the Fund’s 
investments are made mostly through mezzanine or quasi-equity instruments, including debt 
with profit sharing or a royalty scheme, preferred shares, convertible debt, or subordinated 
debt with warrants. Mezzanine financing offers the advantage of creating current income and 
cash flow through interest whilst securing an upside equity potential (Africa Assets, 2014). It 
is trite from the foregoing that the South Sudanese system has failed to yield results in 
relation to the highlighted sectors. There is, therefore, need for reform in order to uplift 
SMEs and allow them to contribute positively to the country’s economy. 
 
8. International examples from which South Sudan can learn 
8.1 Group lending in Africa 
The application of group lending in some post-conflict areas has yielded different results. For 
example, in a study conducted by Wilson (2002), it was revealed that in Mozambique, 
Cambodia and Rwanda, people preferred individual compared to group loans. Richer 
borrowers wanted to save and borrow individually instead of forming groups with the poor. 
They believed that solidarity groups led to sharing other people’s problems especially if 
borrowers are put into a group with people who have no experience in running a business. 
There was, however, a portion of borrowers in Mozambique who still preferred solidarity 
groups in the period immediately after conflict. Solidarity lending was predominantly 
preferred in Angola. The mass migration which led to the destruction of civil society and 
strong individualism did not deter the people from wanting to build relationships and 
cooperate with each other through solidarity groups. Group lending is often perceived as a 
new concept that was innovated by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. However, it existed 
long before the Grameen Bank with two types of institutions that practised it in varying 
forms. These institutions were the Irish Loan Funds and the German credit cooperatives. The 
Irish Loan Funds were formed in the 1700s, grew in size in the 1800s and declined 
significantly in the nineteenth century. The funds granted unsecured small loans, took 
deposits and were based in the rural areas. The borrowers needed to be two in order to access 
the loans and they were both liable for repayments. The repayments were done on a weekly 
basis (Hollis and Sweetman, 1997; Presscott, 1997). There have been innovative lending 




called credit coorperatives, a form of group lending scheme. The German credit cooperatives 
were developed in the late nineteenth century and mainly provided financial resources to the 
rural people. These funds had a policy of unlimited liability which meant that if the 
cooperative failed, any member of the group could be held liable for the total debt of the 
group (Guinnane, 1993; Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994; Presscott, 1997). The 
establishment of these institutions has been centred on two concepts: risk sharing and credit. 
 
8.2 The Gramean Bank of Bangladesh 
South Sudan’s economy is still nascent, having recovered from decades of civil war. However, 
the South Sudanese Government can learn from other judisridictions that have successfully 
implemented sustainable lending models for the poor, within the context of a post-conflict 
economy. For instance, the group lending model employed by the Gramean Bank in 
Bangladesh proved a success. A war of independence had left the country devastated in the 
run up to its independence in 1971, and in dire need of economic recovery. The Bank was 
established in 1983 by Professor Yussuf Muhammed in Bangladesh. The Grameen Bank is 
known world over for its innovative lending to the poor who would otherwise not access 
credit from formal lending institutions primarily because they lack collateral. The Grameen 
Bank includes the poor by practising collateral-free lending which will rely on peer 
monitoring and pressure in enforcing loan repayments. The Grameen Bank’s group lending 
methodology allows the formation of groups of five members with separate groups for 
women and for men. The loans are granted to the individual members of the group, however, 
the group remains liable for repayment. Therefore if one member defaults, the other group 
members cannot receive additional credit until the outstanding loans are repaid. The 
Grameen Bank organises the groups into a community called a centre which usually 
comprises six to eight groups. The centre serves the purpose of monitoring repayments and 
ensuring transparency in transactions in order to eliminate any possible challenges of group 
collusion among selected groups. The amount of loans granted by the Grameen Bank is less 
than US$100 to an individual per year and repayable in 50 equal weekly instalments. The 
loans are granted for various business activities identified by each member of the group or 
the group members help each other in selecting the business activities. The selection of 
business activities and the loans received are discussed at the centre meetings (Khandkher, 
1996). 
 
8.3 Bancosol of Bolivia 
Apart from the Gramean Bank, there are other examples of effective lending models for poor 
economies. Whilst Bolivia has not witnessed a full scale war since the Spanish war in the 
1800s, there is on-going low intensity civil conflict in Bolivia emanating from control over 
natural resources. The discontent which forms the bedrock of the Bolivian strife began with 
the privatization of Bolivia’s natural gas in the mid-1990s, which led to large scale public 
demonstrations against the government. The military response of the State over the years, 
coupled with the fact that the conflict has mainly been between rural indigenous citizens and 
urban dwellers, created an economic climate akin to post-conflict South Sudan. Bolivia’s 
BancoSol is an early example of an MFI that focused on lending to the poor without the 




bank. The core objective of the establishment of BancoSol was to efficiently provide 
affordable lending and to maintain sustainable deposit relations with the self-employed 
entrepreneurs in Bolivia. Four years after inception in 1996 BancoSol had a borrower base of 
71 000 with a total loan portfolio of US$47.4 million (Van Tassel, 2000). BancoSol provides 
unsecured loans with repayment periods ranging between 12 to 24 weeks. The loans are 
made to solidarity groups with a membership size of four to ten and the group receives the 
loan from the bank and divides it amongst themselves. The group members remain jointly 
liable for each other’s loan and therefore, BancoSol requires that the group members work 
within a short distance from each other (Prescott, 1997). BancoSol has been able to achieve 
self-sufficiency in its operation through striking a balance between costs and risks and 
developing a lending technology suitable for its target market. The lending technology has 
derived low cost repayment incentives that have focused on contract design and enforcement 
rather than intensive screening and monitoring (Gonzalez-Vega, Schreiner, Meyer, 
Rodriguez and Navajas, 1996). The success of group lending was also noted in the following 
three territories and indicates a high likelihood of the success of this model for South Sudan. 
This is because all three territories are post-conflict societies whose socioeconomic and 




Colombia’s experience is relevant for South Sudan since it is a developing country located in 
the global south. Colombia is also recovering from what has been termed one of the world’s 
longest civil wars and still has a high number of displaced people (Centre for Justice and 
Accountability, 2014). These people have an acute need to improve their livelihood and self-
employment has been the only available option. Opportunity International, a global 
microfinance network, has partnered with two local organizations, the Associacion General 
de Apoyo a la Pequena Empresa and Opportunidad Latino America Colombia that offer 
microfinance to improve the livelihood of the internally displaces persons (McNulty, 2005). 
These organizations employ three lending methodologies: trust bank recently renamed trust 
groups, solidarity groups and individual lending. The trust group methodology combines 
financial services and social interventions such as health awareness and self-governance 
(McNulty, 2005). The groups, mostly women meet once a week to share personal and 
business advice, receive financial training and vote on loan-related topics. Trust groups elect 
leaders and build a safety net of each other by guaranteeing each other’s loans (Opportunity 
International, 2014). When a loan is repaid the money is then available for the next person. 
The method has led to a loan repayment rate of 98 per cent (Opportunity International, 
2014; Handicap International, 2006). 
 
8.5 Angola 
Angola had been in conflict for over 40 years during which millions were killed and 
displaced. The Bicesse Accords (May 1991) and The Lusaka Protocol (November 1994) 
brought hope for peace but that did not last long. It was not until 4 April 2002 when a 
memorandum of understanding was signed between the Angolan army and the rebels 




economy and led to the accumulation of a massive war debt (Porto and Parsons, 2003). 
Group lending in Angola was piloted in 1995 by the Development Workshop through the 
Women’s Enterprise Development (WED) project. The project aimed to improve the 
economic condition of women in the informal sector in Luanda. The project started off with 
48 women in fisheries and it was a huge success. This success led to an implementation of 
the project on a limited scale and used a more rigorous and sustainable group loan 
methodology. Hence the Sustainable Livelihoods Project (SLP) was launched and it 
employed a lending methodology which was tested for the first time in Angola. The SLP 
targets economically active women and men in the urban informal sector. It utilises a means 
test to select eligible clients from those suggested by other members of the group (Cain, 
2004). Loan repayment is stretched over four months with weekly instalments. The group is 
not required to have collateral, but the group members co-guarantee all loans and weekly 
payments. Thus solidarity group lending in Angola has been identified as a key model in 
rebuilding social capital and livelihoods in post conflict areas. 
 
8.6 Burundi 
Burundi also has a history of violence between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes and was heavily 
intensified during the 1993 to 2005 civil war. Over 200 000 were killed during that conflict 
(Human Rights Watch, 2009). Turame Community Finance, an MFI in Burundi has been 
active in post-conflict Burundi and has utilized group lending to resolve conflict between the 
two tribes and improve their economic well-being. This group lending model is called 
community bank lending methodology. Apart from granting loans to the groups, Turame 
offers conflict resolution training for its staff and bank training for the groups once they have 
been formed. The groups benefit from such training because they learn ways of empathizing 
and internalizing the concepts of reconciliation. Turame was established by World Relief in 
2004 and by 2006, it was recognised as the top MFI in Burundi. Turame projected their 
growth in 2011 to be about 28 000 clients (Ganthier, 2012). It should be noted though, that 
group lending is not necessarily a runaway success. There are territories, such as Malawi, 
Zimbabwe where it has failed to achieve the desired results (Dube, 2012; Simtowe and Zeller, 
2006). 
 
9. Factors to consider in learning from others 
In learning from these international examples, the South Sudanese economic managers must 
consider two crucial factors, namely (a) group lending dynamics, and (b) group loan 
repayment performance. The recent increased interest in the adoption of this concept 
originates from the growing knowledge of informal financial intermediation using groups 
(Paxton, 1996). In a country such as South Sudan which was previously afflicted by armed 
conflict, it is vital that the delivery of any financial intermediation should take into account 
the dire effects of the war on the behaviour of the people. One such effect is the high level of 
mistrust amongst the people which stems from their relationships during the war. It is 
common that in war afflicted areas, people form groups or alliances according to their 
political, ethnic or other inclination. The group therefore acts as as a protecting wall and a 
source of information to the group members. It is therefore crucial that any form of financial 




through these groups rather than individuals. Financial intermediation through groups has 
been widely embraced and has in some jurisdictions proved to be the ideal model. Groups in 
general have Characteristics that could enhance the success of a group lending model and 
these include targeting, transparency, screening of potential borrowers, incentives to repay 
and ability to enforce repayment. Groups tend to meet more frequently and such high 
frequency of meetings helps discourage the participation of untargeted individuals, hence 
credit will be advanced to deserving individuals. Groups are also transparent and open 
because of their frequent meetings. Transparency helps in minimising possible collusion 
between bank staff and group members in activities that could be detrimental to the group. 
Groups also have the ability to screen potential members prior to joining the group in order 
to ensure that the group comprises of trustworthy members. Through meeting frequently 
groups provide an incentive for members to repay their loans, which can also be done during 
the meetings. Hence it will be easier to identify defaulters and the necessary social pressure 
can be exerted on the defaulters (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Conlin (1999) also suggests 
that the implementation of microfinance programmes through groups can minimise 
overhead costs. Groups allow the programme’s fixed costs such as meetings and training to 
be imposed on the groups. This approach discourages risky borrowers from participating in 
the programme, hence safe borrowers feel motivated to repay their loans in order to obtain 
additional loans. There are two variations of group lending: Sequential group lending and 
Static group lending. In Sequential group lending, the group members take loans one after 
another whilst in Static group lending all the group members take loans at the same time and 
start their different projects simultaneously. Research has shown that sequential group 
lending is the most effective variation because it allows the lender to finance more viable 
projects if the monitoring technology meets the required efficiency standards (Aniket, 2003). 
Sequential group lending also resolves the problem of under-monitoring in group lending 
schemes. This lending model can succeed even without joint liability; however, the 
repayment rate may even be more higher if it involves joint liability (Chowdhury, 2005). 
Group lending has been presented as a lending methodology whose success is not deterred 
by whether the borrowers have full information about each other prior to the formation of 
the group or not. Armendariz de Aghion and Golier (2008) also affirm that in cases where 
borrowers are uninformed about their potential partners, group lending plays a major role in 
reducing the negative externalities from risky borrowers to safe borrowers. Whilst in cases 
where borrowers have full information about each other, group lending simply insulates safe 
borrowers from risky borrowers. This brings about the concept of positive assortative 
matching which means groups are allowed to form themselves into homogenous groups. 
Positive assortative matching has been claimed to solve adverse selection problems in group 
lending. However, Guttman (2006) and Aniket (2006) argue that positive assortative 
matching may not be the solution if members of a group are under a threat of refinancing. 
Risky borrowers may be willing to pay more to have safe borrowers in their groups compared 
to what a safe borrower will be willing to pay; hence there will be negative assortative 
matching. Regarding factors affecting group loan repayment performance, there are 
numerous factors that have been identified to affect loan repayment performance within 
groups. These have been drawn from various studies. Kono (2006) conducted a study in 




communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behaviour. The study revealed 
that joint liability creates enormous free riding problems and reduces repayment rates. The 
study also discovered that under joint liability, people failed in risk sharing, that is, those 
who defaulted in previous repayments continued to default strategically and those who paid 
large amounts were always the same individuals. Furthermore, the study revealed that group 
formation is effective in the sense that it allows self-selection amongst borrowers and 
excludes those who default strategically. Karlan (2007) and Fedele (2005) studied the role of 
peer selection under joint liability contracts and concluded that if joint liability contracts are 
offered in group lending, safe borrowers will choose contracts with higher joint liability and 
lower interest rates whilst risky borrowers will choose contracts with lower joint liability and 
higher interest rates. This results in improved loan repayment performance and welfare of 
the groups especially because the risky borrowers have no collateral. Al-Azzam et al. (2008) 
also conducted a study that sought to examine the impact of joint liability, screening and 
monitoring activities and social ties of the group leader and other group members on 
repayment performance. The findings of the study revealed that the group leaders’ joint 
liability and screening and monitoring activities are strongly related to repayment 
performance than any other variables for the entire group. Further, social ties of all members 
have a significant role on repayment while monitoring activities had no effect. Hermes et al. 
(2005) also concluded that the monitoring activities do not have any stronger positive impact 
to the repayment performance of the group. Bassem (2008) as well as Al-Azzam et al. (2008) 
studied the factors that affect repayment in group lending in Tunisia and concluded that 
internal rule of conduct, same business, knowledge of the other members of the group before 
its formation, peer pressure, self-selection, sex, education, and non-financial services 
positively influence loan repayment. However, homogeneity and marital status negatively 
influence loan repayment. Cassar et al.(2007) and Abbink et al. (2006) came up with 
evidence to the effect that societal similarities, group size and trust amongst group peers is 
more vital to group loan repayment compared to general friendships or societal trust 
between members. Proponents of this view such as Ahlin and Townsend (2007) conclude 
that repayment performance is affected negatively by joint liability and social ties and 
positively affected by strength of local sanctions and correlated returns. Coleman (1999) 
reveals evidence to the contrary with the revelation that the number of relatives in the village 
has a positive and significant influence on borrowing. He believes that relationships amongst 
group members would increase trustworthiness which is necessary for one to be selected into 
a group by their peers. The relationships would further assure support and insurance for a 
member who would have difficulty in repaying a loan. Sharma and Zeller (1997) oppose this 
view and conclude that repayment problems escalate if there are more relatives in a group 
because relatives tend to trust each other. As a result they do not conduct screening, 
monitoring and enforcement in the formation of their groups. Goransson and Östergren 
(2010) also added that individuals usually have a greater chance of receiving more loans if 
they have low trust levels. Hermes et al. (2005), conducted a study which sought to 
investigate the relationship between monitoring and social ties of a group leader with group 
members against repayment performance. The study which was conducted amongst 102 
groups in Eritrea concluded that social ties of a group leader have a positive relationship with 




hypothesis that monitoring activities of a group leader has a positive effect on group 
repayment performance. It is also important to consider the performance of group versus 
individual loans. Other authors like Andersen and Nina (2000) analysed the effect of effect 
collateral on group lending in a model with high risk and low risk entrepreneurs in a 
competitive banking system. The authors concluded that banks have lower risk if they lend to 
joint limited liability groups than with individual lending. This is because they receive 
repayment from all over the region. The lower risk then allows the bank to reduce the 
interest rate which then makes the bank attract less risky borrowers. As a result the bank is 
able to serve more customers and break-even as is the case with individual lending (Dube, 
2012). Empirical evidence suggesting whether group loans outperform individual loans is 
limited. Hermes and Lensik (2007) posit that even though individual based microfinance 
institutions seem to perform better in terms of achieving profits, a close analysis reveals that 
the fraction of poor borrowers and female borrowers in the loan portfolio is lower than for 
group-based institutions. They further assert that individual-based lending is often 
negatively affected by increasing interest rates above a certain threshold, whilst the same 
cannot be said of group-lending. Finally, they argue that the growth of microfinance 
institutions also has an impact on individual-based lending, for example, as they grow larger, 
they tend to focus on wealthier clients. This is less pronounced in group-based microfinance 
institutions. A study conducted by Gomez and Santor (2003) also brought evidence that 
group lending reduces the borrower default rate compared to individual lending, and it is 
attributed to peer selection during group formation and peer monitoring once the group is 
established. Zhang (2008) investigated whether group lending compared to individual 
lending has the information advantage to overcome ex-ante moral hazard and efficiency 
advantage of improving repayment performance. The findings of the model showed that 
group lending can overcome ex-ante moral hazard problems compared to individual liability 
if there is peer-cooperation and group members make decisions cooperatively. Gine and 
Karlan (2010) and Atanasio et al. (2011) revealed that individual liability compared to group 
liability did not lead to any change in repayment but led to larger lending groups.  
 
10. Conclusion and recommendations 
The financial system in South Sudan is still developing and much still has to be done to 
facilitate SME access to credit. There are a number of domestic and international banks 
operating in South Sudan, a majority of which primarily perform foreign exchange 
operations. Interest rates, like in many other African countries, remain high (up to 18 per 
cent) for what is essentially an unsecured loan. Further, credit-seekers lack the capacity to 
present a proper business plan or feasibility study to justify a loan. It should be noted that 
there is no credit reporting mechanism as of yet. The IFC is currently empowering local 
banks through training in credit risk management. The Corporation is also helping in 
designing agriculture and trade finance products, aimed at rejuvenating South Sudan’s SME 
industry. Norfund has also established an investment company, Kinyeti Venture Capital Ltd 
in cooperation with the Swedish Fund (Swedfund). Kinyeti offers SMEs in South Sudan loans 
and equity, with a goal of making investments of between 275 000 and 5million NOK 
(approximately US$ 46 103 to US$ 838 237). There are a few microfinance institutions in 




who are new in the business environment. The women only access the loans once they have 
formed groups of 15 to 30 members. Finance South Sudan Limited also offers group loans to 
groups of 5 to 20 members. The borrowers’ business should have existed for at least six 
months and the groups undergo a four-week training before accessing the loans. Rural 
Finance Initiative also offers group loans to low income rural dwellers. The MFI has 
successfully alleviated poverty in the rural areas of South Sudan. These findings show that 
the practice of group lending in South Sudan is very limited and there is poor or no 
documentation of the effectiveness of the model. It is trite that group lending is a topical 
issue in microfinance. It is still a phenomenon that other countries are adopting because of 
its success in countries such as Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi and Columbia. 
However, there have also been some cases of failure of the methodology and these give a 
holistic view of the effectiveness of this methodology in reaching the poor (Dube, 2012). All 
these notwithstanding, group lending offers hope for the South Sudanese economy, which is 
still at its infancy and the scars of the protracted civil conflict are still very fresh. There are 
numerous social, economic, legal and political challenges which negatively affect the 
establishment and growth of the SME sector. South Sudan’s efforts to revive the SME sector 
are quite visible, but have produced very little over the past 3 years. Group lending offers an 
opportunity for South Sudan to create funding opportunities for small businesses, who would 
otherwise not have access to finance that is provided by mainstream financial institutions. 
Group lending would also help emerging business people without land to access credit to 
grow their business concerns. We therefore recommend sequential group lending as a viable 
model for South Sudan as opposed to simultaneous group lending. In sequential group 
lending, the borrower disburses loans sequentially within the group and the second borrower 
obtains the loan only if the first borrower successfully repays their loan. Whilst in 
simultaneous lending, the borrowers in the group receive their loans simultaneously from 
the lender. The pros of sequential lending that suit the business environment in South Sudan 
is that it allows the lender to temporarily separate the borrowers’ decisions on their 
respective tasks. Hence the lender only incentivises the borrowers’ tasks individually and not 
collectively. Sequential lending is also effective in case where the group has heterogeneous 
members, that is, members with different business management experience. The members 
that have vast experience will be able to school those that have little or no experience. Since 
the business environment is still at its infancy, it is important that the lenders increase their 
profits in order to finance more projects. Sequential lending will help the lender achieve this 
by allowing them to sort out the borrower’s type in the first period of lending and as the 
transmission of information amongst the borrowers increases. As a result, the lender is able 
to screen the groups more effectively using the outcome from the first borrowers. Although 
sequential lending leads to the punishment of the whole group if the first borrower’s project 
fails, it does, however, allow the lender to finance a wider range of projects as compared to 
projects that can be financed through simultaneous lending. Sequential lending will also 
allow the lender to lower the loans allocated to the borrowers because the loans are not 
granted collectively but individually. Gramean Bank also follows sequential lending with 
much recorded success (Aniket, 2007). For South Sudan, we do not recommend the use of 
the means test utilised by MFIs in Angola in selecting groups. This is because the 




from organic group formation, which is key in post-conflict societies. Groups should 
therefore have the autonomy to compose themselves, as this is largely influenced by ethnic, 
political, and economic considerations as well as personal considerations such as trust. It 
should be noted, in conclusion that further insight into the topic of this paper could still be 
explored in future when more relevant data is available from South Sudan. 
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